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Abstract 
We experimentally investigate the effects of real and minimal identities on group conflict. In 
turn we provide a direct empirical test of the hypotheses coined by Amartya Sen that the 
salience of a real identity escalates conflict but that of a mere classification would not do so. 
In a baseline treatment, two groups – East Asians and Caucasians – engage in a group contest, 
but information on the racial composition of the groups is not revealed. In the minimal 
identity treatment each group is arbitrarily given a different color code, whereas in the real 
identity treatment the race information is revealed. Supporting Sen’s hypotheses, we find that 
compared to the baseline, free-riding declines and conflict effort increases in the real identity 
treatment but not in the minimal identity treatment. Moreover, this occurs due to an increase 
in efforts in the real identity treatment by females in both racial groups.  
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1. Introduction 
Conflict between groups is omnipresent. Group members expend costly resources in such 
conflicts in order to gain material benefits, or to achieve social recognition, or to avoid a loss. 
Examples include racial conflict, conflict relating to language, religion or culture, political 
competition, collective rent-seeking, to name but a few. Such group conflicts are costly for 
the individual group members and often costly also for the society.
1
 It is hence not surprising 
that researchers across disciplines continue to study the reasons leading to such conflict, and 
possible ways to eradicate them. A component that is often seen to be common in initiation 
and escalation of various group conflicts is group identity. In this paper we consider this 
particular aspect and investigate the effects of the salience of specific types of identities on 
group conflict. We consider a real identity and a minimal identity in defining groups, and 
compare their effects on conflict relative to a situation in which no identity is made salient. 
In his seminal work, Sen (2007) introduces the relationship between the salience of an 
identity and conflict. Sen considers ‘identity’ as an attribute that provides a ‘strong-and 
exclusive-sense of belonging’ to a group. He hypothesizes that in certain situations, when a 
particular identity (e.g., religion or race) becomes salient, it can then engender conflict and 
can even lead to its escalation. He further introduces the concept of ‘classification’ and 
differentiates the same from ‘identity’. A classification (e.g. one’s shoe-size or one’s time of 
birth) is a mere categorization that is ‘cheap’ and does not necessarily have ‘durable 
importance’. It is also often interpreted as a minimal identity. As a result, when an identity or 
a classification determines the concept of a group, the salience of the (real) identity increases 
conflict but that of a minimal identity (classification) does not.
2
 In this study we conduct a 
laboratory experiment to investigate the relationship between the salience of identities and 
conflict. We ask the following questions: Is there empirical support for Sen’s hypotheses 
about the effects of identity on conflict? Does real identity initiate and instigate conflict more 
than does a mere classification (minimal identity)? Is the effect of identity symmetric across 
agents? 
                                                          
1
 The earliest documented group conflict resulting in fatalities was between 14,000 BC and 12,000 BC in Nubia 
(present-day Sudan) in which at least 59 people died (Kelly, 2005). Almost 15,000 years later, in the last century, 
the conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi populations in Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda claimed more than a 
million lives. Even when fatalities are not involved, group conflicts often create costs such as long run tension 
and hatred, intentional destruction of property, expense of resources on unproductive defense activities, etc. 
2
 Note, however, that when a classification gains durable importance then it may be as important as a real 
identity. We do not consider such classifications in our analysis, and return to this issue in the discussion.  
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We run a group contest experiment with a group specific public good prize. In this 
game group members expend individually costly effort for their group and the sum of all 
group members’ efforts influences the probability of winning the prize. Irrespective of the 
outcome of the contest, all players lose their efforts – resembling conflict situations in the 
field. Furthermore, irrespective of the individual effort expended, every member of the 
winning group wins the prize – again, replicating various field situations. We rely on the 
theory by Katz et al. (1990) and the experimental procedures in Abbink et al. (2010) for the 
basic structure of the experiment, and introduce the concepts of identity and classification 
within this structure. 
We employ three treatments. In the baseline, two three-player groups – one consisting 
of East Asians, and the other consisting of Whites (Caucasians) – engage in the group contest, 
but no information about the group composition is revealed. In the treatment capturing 
classification or minimal identity the same experiment is run, but each group is arbitrarily 
given a different color code. In the real identity treatment the racial compositions of the 
groups are revealed. We introduce race as the real identity since historically race provides 
one of the strongest and most exclusive-sense of belonging. To ensure that the design for the 
minimal identity treatment is as close as possible in spirit to the definition of classification by 
Sen (2007), the dimension of the categorization would have to be ‘cheap’ as well as ‘non-
durable’ and easy to make salient. A random color code meets all these criteria and hence the 
same is implemented in the ‘classification’ treatment. In the baseline we did not provide any 
sense of categorization or belonging. Whereas the color codes provide the salience of an 
explicitly cheap and durably unimportant ‘categorization’; in the baseline treatment (given 
the frame and the instructions) this categorization remains absent, and hence is not salient. 
The relationship between identity and several other behavioral outcomes is well 
examined in the literature. Sherif et al. (1961), Turner (1978), and Tajfel & Turner (1979) 
among others investigate this broad topic in Social Psychology. Sherif et al. (1961) is a 
milestone in both identity and conflict research areas. They conduct a field experiment in 
which two groups of boys engage in a series of group competitions. To our knowledge, this is 
the very first ‘group contest’ research as well as the first group identity research in any 
branch of social science. The boys engaged in pre-contest group activities to induce group 
identity. It is found that over the time of the contests, the group members become hostile 
towards out-group members. Since this seminal study, social psychologists have studied the 
role of identity in prejudice (Brewer, 1999), discrimination (Sassenberg & Mummendey, 
2003), stereotypes (Steele et al., 2002), among others.  
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In the area of conflict as well, there have been important contributions by Tajfel & 
Turner (1979), Jackson (2002) and Tajfel (2010, ch. 2, 3, 10), among many others. Within 
Economics, Sen (1985) himself studies the effects of identity on coordination. However, the 
exploration of the effects of identity in the economics literature starts with the seminal study 
by Akerlof & Kranton (2000). Since then, a series of studies have emerged.
3 Chen & Li (2009) 
stand out by employing a minimal identity paradigm similar to the idea of ‘classification’ as 
explained in Sen (2007).  
Existing field studies or laboratory experiments in social psychology and in 
economics have shown that an introduction of an identity elicits in-group out-group 
discrimination.
4
 It has further been shown that group identity can be formed in terms of 
inequality (Esteban et al., 2012a, b), or communication (Cason et al., 2012) and that such a 
group identity can be exploited to invoke stereotypes (Shih et al., 1999), to manage diversity 
(Eckel & Grossman, 2005), or to solve hold-up problems (Morita & Servátka, 2013). To 
explore identity related conflicts, existing experimental studies often employ games such as 
the prisoner’s dilemma, the dictator game or the public good game that examine ‘conflict of 
interests’ in agents, but are not designed to replicate group conflict situations in which group 
members expend costly resources to gain something. Thus, although the hypotheses coined in 
Sen (2007) are often discussed in various studies, there exists no research testing them, or to 
find the effects of different levels of identity on behavior. In this study we investigate, in a 
controlled setting, the effects of the salience of a particular identity and classification on 
‘Conflict’ and provide direct empirical tests. 
Since we consider a public good prize in the group contest setting, the set of research 
closest to the current one are in the area of the effects of identity in social dilemma such as a 
public good or a threshold public good game (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Solow & Kirkwood, 
2002; Eckel & Grossman, 2005; Croson et al., 2008; Drouvelis & Nosenzo, 2013; Charness 
et al., 2014; Gumen, 2015). In each of these studies, at least in one treatment a specific 
identity is invoked in a social dilemma setting; and in general, such identity increases 
contribution. These studies often find heterogeneous effect of the identity among subjects.   
In our experiment, we find that in all the treatments subjects expend significantly 
more effort than is predicted by Nash equilibrium. However, efforts are significantly higher 
                                                          
3
 For example, Robinson (2001), Akerlof & Kranton (2002, 2005, 2008, 2010), and Basu (2005) analyze the 
theoretical background and Fershtman & Gneezy (2001), Goette et al. (2006), Deck et al. (2009), Chen & Li 
(2009), Hargreaves Heap & Zizzo (2009), Chen & Chen (2011), Kranton et al. (2013), Chen et al. (2014), 
Stoddard and Leibbrandt (2014) pursue field and experimental studies in related areas. 
4
 See, e.g., Tajfel & Turner (1979) from social psychology; and Benjamin et al. (2010), Deck et al. (2009), 
Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo (2009), Klor and Shayo (2010), Cason et al. (2012) from economics. 
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in the real identity (but not in the minimal identity) treatment than in the baseline treatment. 
Furthermore, these results are obtained both due to a reduction in free-riding (expending zero 
effort), and an increase in efforts in the real identity treatment. Neither racial group, as a 
whole, behaves differently from the other. However, regardless of race, females expend 
significantly higher effort than males, and (in the line with the social dilemma literature) the 
difference widens when the real identity is revealed.  
There are existing studies in the literature that investigate the effects of identity on 
conflict behavior. Some studies (e.g. Kranton et al., 2012) employ a variation of a dictator 
game whereas some others (e.g. Gumen, 2015) employ a public good game. Furthermore, 
there are existing social preference studies on identity – as cited above – that find higher 
levels of in-group preference with identity. Hence, it is important to distinguish this study 
from the existing ones, as well as emphasize the importance of the findings of the current 
study.  
Understandably, the reasons for conflict are intertwined with the social preferences of 
the agents. However, it is not established in the literature that the preference will definitely 
result in a higher conflict level for identity but not for classification. To our knowledge, ours 
is the first study in the identity literature that examines the effects of the ‘levels’ of identity 
(none to classification to real) on human behavior. Furthermore, we believe that we introduce 
a new and more appropriate framework in the relevant identity literature to analyze conflict. 
In any conflict agents expend irretrievable resources to gain something, and whereas only the 
winners gain, irrespective of the result everybody lose their expended resources. Only a 
contest game is appropriate to capture this feature. No other games can capture this basic and 
intrinsic feature of conflict. Take the public good game for example: these are very useful 
games to understand social dilemmas between own and societal interest and hence, are apt for 
analyzing ‘conflict of interest’, but not ‘conflict’.   
Hence, in this paper we provide a framework that is the most appropriate in a 
laboratory setting to analyze conflict, and introduce identity in such a framework for the first 
time. We also introduce different levels of identity and provide with an empirical test of the 
hypotheses coined by Sen (2007). We confirm systematically, instead of simply conjecturing, 
that real identity indeed increases the initiation and the level of conflict, whereas a mere 
classification does not. The results make a two-fold contribution. They support Sen (2007)’s 
argument that a salient real identity initiates (in terms of the reduction of free-riding) and 
escalates (in terms of higher positive effort) conflict. Moreover, a minimal identity 
(classification) does not increase conflict significantly – further supporting his hypothesis. 
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Investigating gender differences, we conclude that the effect of identity, at least in this set-up, 
is asymmetric across gender. This study also contributes to the literature on identity itself by 
incorporating and analyzing conflict, and show how various types of identity affect conflict 
behavior. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical 
background of the conflict model we use. Section 3 explains the design of the experiment. 
Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Theoretical background 
We study a group contest in which multiple groups compete for a prize. Group members 
expend costly effort that constitutes the ‘group effort’. The group effort determines the 
group’s likelihood of winning the prize. In particular, a group’s probability of winning the 
prize is equal to the group’s effort divided by the total group effort of all competing groups.  
Let the number of groups competing for the prize be        and the number of (risk-
neutral) group members in each group be       . Each player   in each group     
        has the same endowment,    , from which he/she can expend effort          . 
Any effort expended by a member of group   increases the likelihood that group   will win 
the prize. Any endowment not expended remains with player i.  
The group effort of group  ,   , is the sum of the effort expended by all members of 
group  , i.e.,    ∑     . Let the total group effort by all groups competing for the prize, i.e., 
by all    players, be   ∑    . The probability with which group   wins the prize,   , is 
determined by a lottery contest success function (Tullock, 1980) and is given by 
   {
                   
                    
. 
The prize is a group-specific public good prize, i.e., each member of the winning 
group earns the prize regardless of their level of effort expended. Let the common prize value 
be    . The losing groups receive a prize of 0. The expected payoff of player i in group g 
is  
               , 
where the first term is the expected value of the prize and the second term is the part of the 
endowment that player i kept with them. From Katz et al. (1990) it can be shown that there 
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exist multiple equilibria and individual equilibrium efforts cannot be characterized.
5
 However, 
in any equilibrium, the group effort for each group is  
            . 
In a finitely repeated game, the sub-game perfect equilibrium prediction is that each 
group will expend    in each repetition of the stage game.  
3. Experimental Design and Hypotheses 
3.1 Design and Procedures 
The experiment consists of a finitely repeated contest between two groups of three group-
members each, and the core design is very similar to the design implemented in Abbink et al. 
(2010). In the experiment, each member of each group is endowed with 60 Experimental 
Currency Units (ECUs) which they can allocate to a group account or to an individual 
account. Once all individuals make a decision, the lottery contest success function is used to 
determine the winner. Each member of the winning group is awarded 40 ECUs. Subjects are 
then informed of the total ECUs in their group account, the total ECUs in the other group’s 
group account, which group has won the prize, and their individual earnings in ECUs from 
that period. Three-player groups and aggregated information feedback ensure no in-group 
reputation effect. 
This contest is repeated for 20 periods. Subjects cannot use past earnings in future 
periods and receive a fresh endowment of 60 ECUs in every period. At the end of the session, 
each subject is shown their individual earnings in ECUs in each of the 20 periods. All 
subjects are then paid for the same 5 periods chosen randomly at the rate of 25 ECUs to 1 
GBP. In terms of the theoretical model presented above, the parameters of the contest in our 
experiment are              and     . Hence, the equilibrium prediction in our 
experiment is that group effort for each group is 10 ECUs, i.e.,      , in each of the 20 
periods.
6
 
                                                          
5
 Katz et al. (1990) consider an additive group production technology. There are other technologies such as 
weakest-link (Lee, 2012), best-shot (Chowdhury et al., 2013), or a mix (Chowdhury and Topolyan, 2016) that 
are considered in the literature. But we restrict our attention to the most popular and obvious one as described 
above.  
6
 Note that the endowment given to the subjects is higher than the Nash equilibrium level of group effort 
      , so the theoretical prediction across treatments remains as the Nash equilibrium level of effort. Baik et 
al. (2016) show that even when       if the endowment is different across treatments then it can affect 
observed effort level across treatments due to behavioral reasons. But, since in our case the endowment is the 
same across treatments and we are interested in treatment effects, this does not affect our analysis. 
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In all treatments 9 subjects from each of the two racial cohorts, East Asians and 
Whites (Caucasians), participate in a session. Within each cohort, subjects are randomly and 
anonymously assigned to groups of three. Two groups – one from each racial cohort – are 
then randomly and anonymously paired. Thus, all three members of a group are from the 
same racial cohort and the two competing groups are composed of subjects from the two 
different racial cohorts.
7
 The matching within and between groups remains fixed throughout a 
session.  
It is important to clarify our subject-recruitment strategy due to the specific nature of 
the experiment. All the subjects were students at the University of East Anglia, UK. In this 
university there are similar proportions of White Caucasian and East Asian students, who 
together constitute around 90% of the student population. Hence, it is convenient to 
implement racial identity in the laboratory, and to recruit White and East Asian subjects, 
without raising suspicion – as almost all other experiments have similar racial compositions 
in subject cohorts. We sent recruitment emails only to East Asian and White subjects from 
the university subject-database through ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). We filtered using 
participants’ self-reported country of citizenship (Northern Europe, Western Europe, USA, 
Canada etc. for Whites; and China, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan etc. for East 
Asians) and their name. The second criterion, name, filtered out students whose name do not 
seem to be one of the two racial categories (e.g. Latino students from the USA or British 
students of Indian origin). We recruited more subjects than required, and randomly chose 9 
subjects from each race at the start of a session. The remaining recruited subjects received a 
turn-away fee. We also ensured that ethnically the subjects entering the laboratory are indeed 
Whites or East Asians. In only one case a Black student with Western name from the USA 
showed up and received a turn-away fee; we did not include her in that session.  
We employ three between-subject treatments and four sessions in each treatment. In 
the Baseline (no identity) treatment no information about the group composition is revealed. 
In the instructions we use phrases such as ‘your group’ and the ‘group you are matched with’. 
In the Color (‘classification’ or ‘minimal identity’) treatment the same experiment is run, but 
each group is arbitrarily given a different color code – either Green or Blue. The instructions 
in this treatment mention, at the beginning, that everyone in their group is of the same color 
                                                          
7
 Since there are various real identities that can be considered as the focus of conflict, it is important to narrow 
down on a specific identity. Young (1982) argues that: “(r)ecent history suggests that the major pattern of 
conflict cohere around two organizing principles: class and ethnicity”. Indeed existing studies have shown that 
race or ethnicity remains one of the most important factors in various social conflicts across the globe (e.g. 
Esteban & Ray, 2012a, b; Reynal-Querol, 2002). Hence, in this paper we consider race as the real identity.  
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code and that everyone in the group they are matched with is of the other color code. All the 
remaining parts of the instruction remain the same as in the Baseline. To test if there are any 
interactions between race and the color code, in half the Color sessions, East Asians were in 
the Green group while Caucasians were in the Blue group (Green-Blue). The color codes 
were reversed in the other half of the sessions (Blue-Green). In the Race (real identity) 
treatment the racial compositions of the groups are revealed. The subjects are informed at the 
beginning of the instructions that everyone in their group is of the same race and that 
everyone in the group they are matched with is of the other race. The remaining parts of the 
instruction stay the same as in the Baseline. The instructions are available in the Appendix. 
The experiment involved a total of 216 subjects who could participate in only one 
session. No subject had prior experience in participating in a contest or in an identity 
experiment. Sessions were computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), and was run by 
an East-Asian and a White research assistant. At the beginning of each session, instructions 
were handed out and were read aloud by an experimenter. No other information, including 
details of race, was disseminated. Subjects were required to answer a quiz before the 
experiment began. Each session lasted ~60 minutes and average earning per subject was ~16 
GBP.  
3.2 Hypotheses 
Given the design and the discussions above, we construct the following hypotheses 
about behavior in the experiment. Whereas Hypotheses 1 and 2 come directly from Sen 
(2007); Hypothesis 3 comes as a corollary to his work. The effect of the salience of a 
particular identity might not be the same for all individuals, since their background, norm and 
other condition may affect the behavior. In our context, this means race-specific social norms 
may affect how individuals from a particular race react to the salience of race. However, 
there is no ex-ante reason to consider this effect to be stronger for a particular race. Hence we 
state a no-difference of the effects of identity across races in the last hypothesis.   
We test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 both at the group level as well as the 
individual level, and Hypothesis 3 at the individual level. 
Hypothesis 1 (Sen, 2007: Identity). Effort expended in the Race treatment is significantly 
higher than the effort expended in the Baseline treatment. 
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Hypothesis 2 (Sen, 2007: Classification). Effort expended in the Color treatment is not 
significantly different from the effort expended in the Baseline treatment. 
Hypothesis 3 (Homogeneous effect). Change in individual effort expended between 
treatments is the same across racial groups. 
4. Results 
Each treatment has 72 subjects, but the subjects receive feedback on group efforts of their 
group and of the competing group after every period. Hence, each competing pair of groups 
(consisting of 6 subjects) forms an independent observation. We first test if a particular color 
has an effect on behavior in the Color treatment. We run a random-effects regression of 
individual efforts on a constant, one-period lagged own effort, one-period lagged effort of the 
rival group, a time trend and a color dummy and found no significant differences in behavior 
between these two color labels (p-value for the dummy = 0.372). Hence, in all our subsequent 
analyses, we pool data from the Green-Blue and the Blue-Green sessions under the Color 
treatment. There are thus 12 independent observations in each treatment. 
4.1 Group-Level Analysis  
We first investigate if there are differences between the treatments at the group level before 
moving to an individual level analysis of the reasons for any treatment differences. Table 1 
presents summary statistics of the mean (averaged over all 20 periods) per-period group 
effort by competing pairs of groups.  
Table 1. Mean (St. Dev.) of Competing group pairs’ Efforts  
Treatment Baseline Color Race 
Average 
Standard Dev. 
34.869 
(13.161) 
38.006 
(9.607) 
46.008 
(17.401) 
 
Observe that the average effort in any treatment is higher than the effort predicted by 
the Nash equilibrium (10). Wilcoxon signed-rank tests confirm this result (p-value < 0.001 
for all treatments). This, however, only reiterates the robust phenomenon that overdissipation, 
i.e., expending more effort than the Nash prediction, occurs in this type of contest 
experiments (Dechenaux et al., 2015). A more interesting observation arises when we 
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compare the group efforts across treatments. Mean group efforts over all the 20 periods 
shows a monotonic increase from Baseline to Color to Race. Specifically, the increase from 
the Baseline to the Race treatment is from 34.869 ECUs to 46.008 ECUs, or an increase of 
31.95%.   
To investigate if the patterns observed above are driven by behavior only in particular 
periods or in particular effort range, we plot the mean group efforts over periods (Figure 1) 
and their empirical CDFs over the effort range (Figure 2). For all treatments, overall efforts 
decrease over time, but still stay above the equilibrium effort (the red horizontal line in Fig. 
1). Efforts are also distributed over the whole effort range, but the Race treatment seems to 
stochastically dominate the Baseline. Furthermore, the mean group efforts over period for 
each racial group shows similar pattern as in Figure 1; and so do the distributions of groups 
efforts for each racial group with Figure 2. Hence, we do not present the race specific figures. 
 
 
Figure 1. Mean group effort over period by treatment  
 
Figure 2. Empirical CDFs of group effort  
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Figure 1 reinstate that group efforts in the Race treatment are always higher than the 
efforts in the Baseline or in the Color treatments. The comparison between the Color and the 
Baseline treatments, however, is not that obvious. Efforts in the Color treatment remain 
higher than, although very close to, the efforts of the Baseline treatment. Figure 2 shows that 
while the efforts are distributed over the whole range, the effort levels are higher in the Race 
treatment compared to the Baseline and probably also to the Color.   
We next test whether the differences noted above are statistically significant with a 
Kruskal-Wallis test. It confirms that the efforts distributions are different in the different 
treatments (p-value < 0.001). To further examine treatment differences and the direction of 
the differences, we first run pairwise Mann-Whitney tests at the group-pair level. It shows a 
significant difference at the 10% level between the Race and the Baseline treatments (p-value 
= 0.083), but no difference between the Color and the Baseline treatments (p-value = 0.326). 
We then run a panel random effects regression that uses multiple observations for each group, 
one for each period. The dependent variable is group  's effort in period  , and the 
independent variables are two treatment dummies for Race and Color. We also control for the 
group's own effort in the previous period, the other group's effort in the previous period and a 
time trend.  
In this equations (and also in the two similar equations later) we estimate robust 
standard errors clustered on independent competing pairs. The equations present regression 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
0 40 80 120 160
Group contribution
Baseline Color Race
13 
 
estimates, and ***, **, and * respectively indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
Group effortgt =   10.811
***
 + 3.088
*
 Race + 0.747 Color           
       (2.340)      (1.646)           (1.311) 
      + 0.591
***
 Group effortg,t-1 + 0.156
***
 Rival's Effortt-1 - 0.332
***
 Period 
        (0.058)               (0.051)                             (0.085) 
No. of obs. = 1368. No. of groups = 72. No. of competing group-pairs (clusters) = 36.  
This regression confirms the observations above. The dummy for the Race treatment 
is positive and significant (p-value = 0.061) but the dummy for the Color treatment is not (p-
value = 0.569); groups expend about 3.1 ECUs more per period in the Race treatment than in 
the Baseline treatment. This gives our first result.  
Result 1: Group efforts are higher in the Race treatment than in the Baseline treatment. But 
there is no difference between group efforts in the Color and in the Baseline treatment. 
 Since efforts are contributed in the contest in order to overcome the opponent’s efforts 
and to win the prize, the efforts can be used as a measure of the level of conflict. Result 1 
thus confirms Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 at a group level. First, introducing a real 
identity increased the level of conflict by a group. Second, introducing a minimal identity 
(classification) did not affect the level of conflict significantly. It can also be observed that 
group efforts are positively correlated to lagged own and opponent group efforts, and are 
negatively correlated to time trend. These again confirm earlier findings as in Abbink et al. 
(2010) that group efforts decline over time and that efforts are increasing in their own past 
efforts and in those of the competing ones.  
This result, however, comes with a caveat. While the current design is enough to 
answer our specific research questions (Hypotheses 1 and 2) as coined by Sen (2007), the 
results cannot tease out the effects of identity on in-group cooperation versus out-group hate. 
Hence, the most we can conclude from these results is that a real identity has a direct effect 
on parochial altruism (Choi & Bowles, 2007; Halevy et al., 2008; Abbink et al., 2012, Weisel 
& Bohm, 2015, Weisel and Zultan, 2016). That is, the incremental effect of identity in 
conflict efforts can come either through an increase in group cooperation for the love of own 
group’s identity, or through an increase in hate for the other group’s identity. It is observed in 
the literature (as discussed in the introduction) that in a public good game an introduction of 
identity can indeed increase contribution due to in-group love. But to incur out-group hate, 
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one will have to face a threat from the out-group (Weisel & Bohm, 2015). Since in the 
current design the prize is a group specific public good, and the efforts of the out-group 
reduce the likelihood of one’s obtaining the prize, both effects can be in action. Although it 
will not be an apples-to-apples comparison, one can compare the effect of identity in this 
setting with that in a public good game. It can be observed that an introduction of the real 
identity increased the effort level by about 32% in the current study (Table 1). Comparing 
this with the results of Solow and Kirkwood (2002, p. 408 – both genders: Strangers vs. 
Community) who find about an 8% increase, or Charness et al. (2014, p. 328 – NoGrNoTy vs. 
GrNoTy) who find about a 26% increase in contribution in a public good game with the 
introduction of identity,
8
 it appears that both components of parochial altruism are in effect in 
the current study. 
4.2 Individual-Level Analysis 
We next investigate the reasons for higher efforts in the Race treatment. To do so, one would 
have to analyze the data at an individual level. We are primarily interested in the overall level 
of effort exerted in the conflict. Note that, due to the public good nature of the prize, it is 
possible for the individual subjects to free-ride completely on group-members by expending 
zero effort, or partially by expending low effort. So, the increase in overall effort in the Race 
treatment can occur due to several reasons: either subjects are free-riding less under the Race 
treatment, or they are expending more efforts, or both. To investigate this, we first analyze 
free-riding, and then effort contingent upon not free riding. Establishing the effect of racial 
identity in both the cases, we return our focus to the overall effort level (including zero effort) 
and test whether Result 1 is robust across racial groups (Hypothesis 3). To do so, we analyze 
overall effort level at the individual level – for each of the racial groups.  
4.2.1 Effects of identity on individual free-riding and effort decisions 
We first study the extent of free-riding (expending zero efforts) by individual players 
in each treatment. Note that, each subject can free-ride once in a period, i.e., between 0 and 
20 times in the whole experiment of 20 periods. Figure 3 summarizes the instances of 
treatment-wise free-riding by subjects through the empirical CDFs of the incidence of free 
riding. The horizontal axis in Figure 3 shows the number of times a subject can possibly free-
                                                          
8
 We report these numbers only to provide an idea of the effect of identity in contests compared to a public good 
setting. There are other studies who either do not state explicitly the average effects (e.g. Eckel and Grossman, 
2005), or the setting is very different to make a comparison (e.g. Gumen, 2015) and we do not report them here.  
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ride, and the vertical axis shows the corresponding proportion of actual free riding by 
treatment. It can clearly be observed that the incidence of free-riding is less in the Race 
treatment compared to in the Baseline. But there does not appear to be a large difference in 
the incidence of free-riding between the Color and the Baseline treatment. 
Figure 3.  Empirical CDFs of the incidences of free-riding  
 
To test this observation of treatment effect statistically, we run an individual-level 
regression. Note that we can consider the 20 periods as 20 trials in which free-riding might or 
might not occur. In such a case a binomial regression would be the appropriate model to 
estimate. The dependent variable is the number of instances of free-riding by an individual 
whereas the independent variables are the Race and the Color treatment dummies, a dummy 
for East Asian and a dummy for females. The results are reported in Table 2.   
Table 2. Binomial regression on the incidence of free-riding 
Dependent variable: Number of  
Free-ride by an individual 
Color 0.004 
 (0.050) 
Race -0.082
*
 
 (0.047) 
E. Asian 0.009 
 (0.034) 
Female -0.079
*
 
 (0.044) 
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Constant 0.283
***
 
 (0.052) 
Observations 216 
***, **, and * respectively indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Figures in parentheses 
are robust standard errors. 
Table 2 above shows that compared to the Baseline, the incidences of free-ride 
declines in the Race treatment, but not in the Color treatment. The above results suggest that 
participation in conflict, in terms of reduction of free-riding, increases with the salience of a 
real identity but not of a classification. These findings, further supporting Hypotheses 1 and 2, 
are summarized in Result 2. 
Result 2: The incidence of free-riding is lower in the Race treatment than in the Baseline 
treatment. Color treatment does not show such a difference. 
Given the findings that overall efforts (including free riding) are higher and free-
riding itself is lower in the Race treatment compared to the Baseline, it will be of interest to 
test whether the effort level, contingent upon not free-riding, is also higher in the Race 
treatment. To do so, we first examine individual effort levels by treatment; but consider only 
the cases in which an individual has spent a positive effort. The summary statistics are 
reported in Table 3. Not surprisingly, the number of instances of strictly positive 
contributions are higher in the Race treatment. Furthermore, whereas the increase in overall 
conflict effort (including zero effort) from Baseline to Race treatment was 31.95% (Table 1), 
conditional upon positive effort, this increase is from 15.369 ECUs to 18.434 ECUs, or 
19.94%. Hence, the increase due to a reduction in free-riding is 12.01%. 
Table 3. Individual effort level contingent upon positive effort  
 Baseline Color Race 
Mean 15.369 17.018 18.434 
St. Dev. (10.699) (11.717) (12.025) 
No. Obs 1,089 1,072 1,198 
 
To test whether the observation above is statistically significant we run a hurdle model in 
which the first decision is whether to spend positive effort, and the second decision is to 
decide upon the level of effort given that the effort is positive. Specifically, in the first stage a 
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random effect Probit model and, in the second stage a random effect Tobit model is 
implemented. As expected, and as observed in the descriptive statistics above, in the second 
stage the Race treatment – even after controlling for no free-riding in the first stage – has a 
significant and positive effect on the effort level. The results are reported in Table A1 in the 
Appendix. 
4.2.2 Identity and the overall individual level of conflict effort 
After establishing that identity reduces free-riding and increases effort contingent 
upon not free-riding, we now shift our focus back to the overall level of conflict. We analyze 
the effects of the treatments on the individual level of conflict first by each racial group and 
then by gender.
9
 In Table 4 we present means and standard deviations of individual efforts 
per period (including zero effort) for East Asian and White subjects.  
Table 4. Mean (St. Dev.) Individual Efforts per period separated by race 
 
Baseline Color Race 
White 
11.539 11.510 14.788 
(11.454) (11.466) (12.269) 
 
 
  
East Asian 
11.707 13.828 15.885 
(11.367) (13.443) (13.592) 
All 
11.623 12.669 15.336 
(11.407) (12.543) (12.954) 
Table 4 shows that individual efforts are higher in the Race treatment than in the 
Baseline (15.336 ECUs vs. 11.669 ECUs). Overall, the effort in the Color treatment is not 
much higher (12.669 ECUs) than in the Baseline. Since individual effort decisions are not 
independent, it is not possible to run non-parametric tests aimed at race categories. Hence, we 
once again employ panel regressions to test if the overall treatment differences seen in Table 
4 are statistically significant. The equation below presents the estimates of an individual 
random effects regression of efforts on treatment dummies and controls. The additional 
independent variables are lagged effort of the rival group, the individual's one-period lagged 
effort, a time trend (period), and race and gender dummies.  
                                                          
9
 We also test whether average group efforts between racial groups are different within treatment. We calculate 
differences of group efforts between paired groups and run a Wilcoxon signed rank test to test if this difference 
is zero. For all the treatments, we find no significant difference of bids between White and East Asian groups. 
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Individual effortit =   3.397
***
+ 1.156
** 
Race + 0.321 Color           
            (0.759)     (0.569)            (0.473) 
            + 0.547
*** 
Own efforti,t-1 + 0.056
** 
Rival's Effortt-1 - 0.128
*** 
Period 
               (0.040)      (0.016)                             (0.027) 
            + 0.485 EastAsian+ 0.998
**
Female  
               (0.476)       (0.468) 
No. of obs. = 4104. No. of subjects = 216. No. of competing group-pairs (clusters) = 36.  
It can be clearly observed that the individual efforts are indeed higher in the Race 
treatment than in the Baseline; the treatment dummy is positive and significant at the 5% 
level. Subjects expend 1.16 ECUs more effort per period in the Race treatment than in the 
Baseline treatment. However, although the efforts in the Color treatment are higher than in 
the Baseline, the difference is not statistically significant. We then run three further 
regressions with pair-wise treatment data – between Baseline and Race, Baseline and Color, 
and Race and Color treatments. The results are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. As can 
be seen from the table, the outcomes remain the same. These findings are summarized in the 
following result.  
Result 3: Individual efforts are higher in the Race treatment than in the Baseline treatment, 
but they are not higher in the Color treatment compared to the Baseline treatment. 
 Results 1, 2, and 3 provide formal support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 at a group as well 
as at an individual level. We now test Hypothesis 3, i.e., whether these results are robust 
across racial (and other demographic) groups.  
Note that the significant coefficients of lag effort of the rival group and lag effort of 
own group are potentially very useful to the interpretation of results as indicating rivalry and 
conflict. Namely, increases in effort as a reaction to higher effort of the rival, may suggest 
that subjects are not simply trying to determine the optimal level of effort. If the significance 
of these coefficients are treatment dependent, then it can shed light on out-group hate versus 
in-group love. To test this we run a random effect regression with two sets of interaction 
terms: treatment and lag effort of rival group, and treatment and lag effort of own group. We 
find that there is no significant difference between coefficients of lag choice of rival groups 
in either the Baseline or the Race treatments. Hence we cannot make definitive conclusions 
about subject behavior. The regression results are summarized in Table A4 in the Appendix.
10
  
                                                          
10
 We run several robustness checks with further specifications. We check whether the results are concentrated 
in a particular time period. As can be observed from Figure 1, we find that it is not the case and qualitative 
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Table 4 shows that the increase in efforts in the Race treatment is not very different 
between the two racial groups. Whereas East Asians increase efforts marginally for both 
types of identities, Whites increase efforts only in the real identity treatment but not in the 
minimal identity. The regression reported above suggest no significant difference in effort 
levels between the racial groups. This matches with our earlier finding (footnote 8) that 
average group efforts within treatment between the East Asian and the White group are not 
different. Note, however, that the regressions do not test for differences in effort levels 
between genders or racial groups in the different treatments. We investigate this issue below. 
Although the East Asian indicator is not significant, the coefficients for the Female 
indicator in the above equation is significant. But the regression does not specifically test for 
differences in effort levels between genders or racial groups in the different treatments. 
Therefore, we now investigate whether the effects of identities are heterogeneous across 
genders. To do so, first in Table 5 we present mean and standard deviation of individual bids 
by male and female in all treatments. 
Table 5. Mean (St. Dev.) Individual Efforts per period separated by gender 
  Baseline Color Race 
Male 
Mean 11.523 11.313 12.407 
St. Dev. 
No. Subjects 
(11.599) 
35 
(11.655) 
38 
(11.307) 
36 
Female 
Mean 11.718 14.184 18.265 
St. Dev. 
No. Subjects 
(11.229) 
37 
(13.312) 
34 
(13.814) 
36 
All 
Mean 11.623 12.669 15.336 
St. Dev. 
No. Subjects 
(11.407) 
72 
(12.543) 
72 
(12.954) 
72 
The table suggests that higher efforts in the Race treatment are driven mainly by 
higher efforts by female subjects. Efforts of female subjects increase from 11.718 ECUs in 
the Baseline treatment to 18.265 ECUs in the Race treatment. Females expend more effort in 
the Color treatment (14.184 ECUs) than in the Baseline, but the increment is not as high. 
Males do not show such behavior. This is confirmed by the regression in the equation above: 
females expend about 1 ECU more effort than their male counterparts.  
We further investigate this gender effect by estimating an individual-level random 
effect panel regression with interaction between treatments and gender dummies. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
results remain the same. Moreover, we implemented own lag effort and lag of (own group – own individual) 
effort, and the treatment effects still remain the same. 
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dependent variable is once again individual efforts and the independent variables include 
those in the equation in the regression above along with the interaction terms.  
Individual effortit =   4.156
*** – 0.440 Baseline×female  – 0.559 Color×male           
            (0.664)     (0.485)                             (0.693) 
            + 0.745 Color×female – 0.140 Race×male + 1.995** Race×female 
              (0.816)              (0.710)                   (0.803) 
                + 0.057*** Own efforti,t-1 + 0.057
*** Rival's Effortt-1 - 0.130
*** Period 
               (0.016)       (0.038)                             (0.027) 
            + 0.556 EastAsian  
               (0.508)  
No. of obs. = 4104. No. of subjects = 216. No. of competing group-pairs (clusters) = 36.  
This regression shows that the higher individual efforts in the Race treatment are 
essentially driven by higher efforts expended by females in that treatment. Relative to males 
in the Baseline, females in the Race treatment expend significantly higher effort. The other 
controls show no difference in results from the previous analyses. We further investigate 
whether the higher effort of females in the Race treatment occurs due to an effect of real 
identity or whether it is merely a context-driven behavior (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). We 
include an interaction of female dummy with Race treatment in the regression above, which it 
turns out to be significant but the Color dummy interacting with genders remain insignificant. 
Hence, we conclude that identity itself induces higher efforts by females. 
We, again, run pairwise treatment effects regressions that are reported in Table A3 in 
the Appendix. These pairwise regressions reaffirm that the results hold for the Race treatment 
but not for the Color treatment. Additionally, it shows that females expend significantly 
higher effort in the Race treatment compared to the Color treatment. All these findings are 
summarized in the following result. 
Result 4: The higher efforts in the Race treatment relative to those in the Baseline treatment 
are driven by the higher efforts expended by female subjects. Females also expend 
significantly higher effort in the Race treatment compared to the Color treatment. However, 
there is no significant difference in efforts expended by females between the Color and the 
Baseline treatment, neither there is any difference in effort expended by racial groups. 
Result 4 allows one to reject Hypothesis 3 in the dimension of gender, and asserts that 
although the conflict behavior are robust across racial groups, it is not so across gender. This 
result, that females’ increment in effort due to the revelation of identity is higher than their 
male counterparts, is apparently puzzling. This is because in war, terrorism etc. we expect to 
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see the opposite. This, however, conforms to the general observations of higher effort 
exertion by females in contests (Price and Sheremeta, 2015), that females are more prone to 
the winner’s curse (Casari et al., 2007), and that identity brings in more competitiveness 
among females in a laboratory setting (Cadsby et al., 2013). Moreover, this matches the 
existing general observation that there are differences between the decisions of men and those 
of women (Eckel and Grossman, 2008).  
More importantly, although female participation is not often observed in physical 
conflicts such as war or riots, it is still possible to find external validation for our result. It is 
well understood in the Psychology literature that males are more aggressive and competitive 
in situations in which the conflict is physical and can sustain physical harm. But in non-
physical conflict situations females are either more aggressive than their male counterparts or 
there is no significant gender difference (Eagly and Steffen, 1986; Bjorkqvist, 1994; Hyde, 
2005). Since a laboratory contest game reflects a frame of conflict without inflicting physical 
harm, it enables females to be more aggressive in this game than male subjects. Combining 
this with the evidence that group identity has stronger effects on female contributions 
(Croson et al., 2008), we believe that the current results can explain incremental verbal 
hostility, non-physical intimidation, violation of norms by females when group identity 
becomes prominent. 
5. Discussion 
We investigate the effects of identity and classification in group conflicts in an experimental 
setting. We employ a group contest with no identity, real racial identity and a minimal 
identity (classification) and find that compared to Baseline conflict is significantly higher in 
the real identity treatment but not in the minimal identity treatment. This is due to both 
initiation (less free-riding) and escalation (expending more effort) of conflict in the real 
identity case. Hence, we provide a direct empirical test of the hypotheses coined by Sen 
(2007) that (i) the salience of a real identity can initiate and escalate conflict; but (ii) that of a 
classification will not do so and find support for both. Adding to his hypotheses, we find that 
the increase in conflict in a laboratory contest setting does not arise due to the behavior of a 
particular race, but due to the increase in efforts by females across racial groups in this setting.  
These results contribute to the literature on conflict and as well as to the literature on 
identity. Existing identity studies rely on experiments on ‘conflict of interest’ to analyze 
conflict. Our experiment pushes that front in a laboratory setting, and provides specific 
results. To our knowledge, this is also the first study in the identity literature that examines 
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the effects of the ‘levels’ of identity (none to classification to real) on human behavior. We 
add to the conflict literature by including identity in a controlled setting. These results also 
add to the existing literature on the competitiveness of females (Apesteguia et al., 2012; 
Cadsby et al., 2013; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, 2011), that has thus far shown mixed 
results. 
 The results, however, leave some open issues. First, as mentioned, the results cannot 
tease out the effects of identity on in-group love versus out-group hate and we conclude that a 
real identity has a direct effect on parochial altruism.
11
 Second, we have implemented a 
specific definition of classification as introduced by Sen (2007). However, he also mentions 
that when a classification “acquires derivative relevance”, then it might have similar effect as 
an identity. Borrowing an example from Sen (2007), the time of birth is only a classification. 
But if some dictator decides to kill all people born on a particular time of the day, then a 
salience of that classification will acquire serious relevance and will have similar effects as 
identity. Our experiment is not designed to capture this concept. Third, it is not possible to 
certainly extrapolate and generalize the results to all races beyond the two involved in this 
experiment. Specifically, the quantitative results might change due to norms and cultures if 
different races are considered and it is an empirical question as to whether the results 
generalize. Finally, as discussed earlier, the specific laboratory experiment boils down to 
situations in which the conflict is non-physical. As a result, the external validation of the 
results will have to be in the correct context.  
Quite a few of the caveats stated above can be implemented in future research. But 
many other interesting extensions are also possible. The results seem to be specifically 
interesting since there is no pre-existing conflict between Whites and East Asians in the UK. 
But it will also be intriguing to see the effects when the same experiment is run between 
groups that have pre-existing conflicts. A lab-in-the-field experiment will help in such a case. 
Another extension would be to explore if different dimensions of identity have different 
effects on behavior. For example, it would be interesting to see if the results stated above can 
be generalized to other races or languages or political affiliation and whether Hypothesis 3 
(symmetric effect across races) can then be rejected. Since we found gender effects, an 
obvious extension could be to replicate our experiment with controlled gender ratio. It would 
                                                          
11
 We tested whether individual efforts in the real identity treatment ever go beyond the level such that, if their 
own group wins, they will earn exactly the same as if they don’t contribute at all. This would suggest that 
beating the other group has an intrinsic value beyond within-group efficiency. There are only 28 out of 216 
individuals who exert effort more than that level at least in one round and the number is only 8 if we consider 
those who did so in 3 or more rounds.  
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be useful to run an individual contest experiment that does not have the issues of in-group 
cooperation or free-riding. Finally, identifying mechanisms through which conflict intensity 
can be reduced will be a further important extension. 
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